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Abstract
Using a rich and highly accurate dataset for Portugal spanning from 1986
to 2013, this paper analyzes the determinants of downward nominal wage
rigidity, mainly focusing on macroeconomic factors. The data supports the
hypothesis that recessionary periods alongside with low inflation contribute
to a higher degree of wage rigidity, as measured by the incidence of nominal
wage freezes. It is further highlighted how this lack of wage adjustments con-
tributed to an increase in labor costs which culminated in a wage markup of
6-7%. This paper, thus seems to corroborate the argument that low inflation




The extent and consequences of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity (hence-
forth, DNWR) has been the subject of intense research for its implications on
wage adjustments and monetary policy. Going back at least to Tobin (1972),
inflation is a potential driver to mitigate the extent of nominal rigidity in
so far as it allows real wages to adjust to negative shocks when these are
downward nominally rigid. In this paper, it is highlighted that Portugal is
a case of extreme nominal rigidity, a feature consistent with the Portuguese
institutional framework, and this constraint became strongly binding in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis when the fraction of wage freezes
amounted to about 80%. The low inflation rate linked with this crisis resur-
faced the question of whether higher inflation could have provided a smoother
adjustment to the last financial crisis, according to Tobin’s hypothesis. The
motivation for assessing this issue emerged when contrasting the nominal
wage change distribution in 1984 with that in 2013, depicted in figure 1.
Both years face a recession, but the prior was accompanied by high inflation
and a much lower fraction of wage freezes which allowed real wage cuts to
take place.
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The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is three-fold.
Firstly, all the estimates are retrieved from a representative dataset, Quadros
de Pessoal (QP), where measurement errors are unlikely to occur in a signifi-
cantly scale. The main arguments is that, by law, the information on earnings
is reported by the employer rather than by the employee. Adding this to the
fact that the information contained in the QP survey needs to be available in
a public space at the establishment and is monitored by the Ministry of Em-
ployment to check if firms comply with the labor law (e.g. minimum wages
and wage floors determined by collective wage agreements) further reinforces
the argument that the data is very accurate. Previous studies dealt with this
problem by assuming a distribution for measurement errors (Altonji and De-
vereux, 2000; Fehr and Goette, 2005) but this inevitably always cast doubts
on the reliability of their results. Secondly, another advantage in using this
dataset is the time span it covers, including periods of high and low inflation,
and even deflation. This makes it possible to study wage rigidity in those
settings, instead of extrapolating implications from high inflation years. This
is important because the economic significance of wage rigidity tends to be
higher in low inflation regimes. Thirdly, this paper highlights the micro and
macroeconomic conditions that contribute for the degree of nominal wage
rigidity, by introducing an extension of a parametric model applied previ-
ously by Fehr and Goette (2005). This model captures downward nominal
rigidity dynamics to such extent that one is able to compute the fraction of
workers affected by DNWR, the implied increased labor costs, among other
indicators. The model allow me to simulate an economy with different infla-
tion rates (say, 4%), when faced with a downturn similar to the last financial
crisis, to show the potential implications of increased inflation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, the
existing literature on downward nominal wage rigidity is presented as well
as the literature on the role of inflation under this framework. Section III
describes the process of wage formation in the Portuguese labor market.
Section IV describes the dataset. Section V and VI present the empirical
model and its results, respectively. The conclusions are in Section VII.
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2 Literature Review
By definition, Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity is the partial or full inabil-
ity of nominal wages to adjust downwards. Under low inflation, this implies
that real wages adjust sluggishly to adverse shocks, which may trigger unem-
ployment (Tobin, 1972). The theoretical foundations for nominal rigidities
are, essentially, based on effi cient contract theories (MacLeod and Malcom-
son, 1993; Holden, 2014) and nominal fairness considerations (Bewley, 1999;
Elsby, 2009). On one hand, the prior considers that wage rigidity arises as
a protection on job-specific investments. This type of behaviour render in-
vestments effi cient by avoiding hold-up problems (MacLeod and Malcomson,
1993). In the light of this theory, wages are only renegotiated when one party
has better outside options. On the other hand, the latter theory holds that
a wage cut is seen as unfair, which is likely to lower worker’s morale, and
hence productivity. Therefore, firms will optimally freeze a fraction of wages
scheduled for a cut.
In spite of their differences, it should be kept in mind that both ex-
planations may coexist (Holden, 2014). Nevertheless, both theories predict
a large fraction of wage freezes at the expense of infrequent nominal wage
cuts, which engender an asymmetry in the nominal wage change distribution.
This prediction has been vastly supported in empirical work - Card and Hys-
lop (1996), McLaughlin (1994) and Kahn (1995) for the US; Devicienti et
al. (2007) for Italy; Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) for Germany; Fehr and
Goette (2005) for Switzerland.
Even though there is solid evidence that nominal rigidities exist, the im-
portance of this issue has been subject to controversy. For instance, using the
same dataset, Altonji and Devereux (2000) report a high degree of DNWR
for the U.S, characterized by few wage cuts and a large fraction of freezes,
while others (McLaughlin, 1994; Lebow et al., 1995; Card and Hyslop, 1996;
Smith, 2000) suggest that this asymmetry is somewhat modest, thus raising
doubts about the importance of DNWR. Akerlof et al. (1996) significantly
contributed to this discussion, arguing that most wage cuts are spurious and
arise as a result of measurement errors. Undeniably, improperly controlling
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for measurement errors will most likely downward bias the degree of DNWR
and lead to incorrect inference. As discussed afterwards, the need to control
for measurement errors is mitigated in this study due to the high quality in
the wage data employed.
The role of inflation in easing labor market adjustments arises as a con-
sequence of DNWR. In his influential paper, Tobin (1972) stated that higher
inflation can "grease the wheels of the labor market" by allowing real wages
to adjust faster when these are nominally rigid. A similar argument is made
by Blanchard (2006) who argues that "the slower the adjustment [to prices],
the more the monetary authorities could use inflation to reduce real wages
and therefore limit the increase in actual unemployment in response to an ad-
verse supply shock". A strand of empirical work sought to determine whether
the degree of wage rigidity is related to inflation rate and the finding that
DNWR is lightened when inflation is higher seems robust to different spec-
ifications [see Kramarz (2001) for an empirical review]. For instance, Card
and Hyslop (1997) use a non-parametric approach to point out that a 1 per-
centage point increase in the inflation rate would decrease the fraction of
workers affected by DNWR by 0.5 percentage points, in the U.S; For U.K,
Nickell and Quintini (2003) suggest that an increase in inflation from 2.5%
to 5.5% would be associated with an increase of 1.7 percentage points of the
fraction of male job stayers; For Germany, Bauer et al. (2003) also uncover a
negative relation between the extent of nominal wage rigidity and inflation.
Additionally, another strand of literature argue that inflation may also
hinder effi cient resource allocation by distorting relative prices - “sand ef-
fects”. Higher inflation is associated with more frequent wage and price
changes (i.e. menu costs), higher search costs and greater uncertainty about
the future prices which lowers investment (Friedman, 1977). In particular,
Groshen and Schweitzer (2000) provide an empirical strategy to disantangle
“grease” from “sand” effects. They conclude that a positive net benefit is
attained for an inflation lower than 4%, and the maximum is achieved around
the 2% level.
The DNWR literature has also attracted attention to macroeconomists
for its potential implications on aggregate wages and unemployment dynam-
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ics (i.e. Phillips Curve), and also for its importance to monetary policy as
inflation targets should depend on the degree of wage rigidity (Akerlof et
al., 1996). Surprisingly, it is frequently concluded that wage rigidities have
a trivial impact at the macro scale, even though their prevalence are well
documented at the micro level (Card and Hyslop, 1997; Nickell and Quin-
tini, 2003). This is often called the "micro-macro puzzle" (Lebow et al.,
1999). An exception is Akerlof et al. (1996) who claims that DNWR leads
to employment reductions, through the use of a stochastic simulation of a
calibrated general equilibrium model. Several explanations have been pro-
posed in order to reconcile this apparent contradiction. Elsby (2009) asserts
that previous literature did not consider the inter-temporal optimization of
the firm. The author shows that the risk of future DNWR will lead forward-
looking firms to not only avoid nominal wage cuts, but also compress wage
increases. Another explanation is that a significant part of real wage adjust-
ments is experienced by new hires, for whom DNWR is less binding but are
usually not considered in empirical work (Farès and Lemieux, 2000). Indeed,
there is evidence that real wages for new hires are more procyclical than for
job stayers (Carneiro et al., 2010).
More recently, the debate on wage rigidity and inflation has gained re-
newed proeminence. The financial crisis of 2008 was followed by a period of
low inflation and productivity growth, which has given rise to wage freezes
and an upward trend in unemployment. Blanchard et al. (2010) and Krug-
man (2014) question the adequacy of 2% inflation target in the last crisis
and argue in favour of a higher target (typically suggested to be around 4%)
as the actual one most likely did not provide suffi cient cushion to circum-
vent nominal rigidities. Undoubtedly, this resurfaced the question of whether
higher inflation could ease labor market adjustments.
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3 Wage formation in Portugal
The Portuguese labor market is often regarded as an extreme case of down-
ward nominal wage rigidity (Dickens et al., 2006). Indeed the Portuguese
labor law legally prohibit nominal wage cuts for job stayers, since the 1950s.
The article no 129 sets that “The employer is prohibited to decrease em-
ployee’s compensation, except for particular cases provided in this code or
in regulation of collective bargaining instruments”.1 Ultimately, this means
that a nominal wage decrease is hardly imposed, as non-compliance with the
law results in heavy sanctions to the firm.
Adding to the feature of wage formation described above, the Portuguese
labor market is strongly driven by collective bargaining outcomes which are
mostly determined by industry-wide agreements. These negotiations, even
though affecting a whole sector, are only taken by union members and em-
ployer’s associations which have a low national representation. Indeed, the
most relevant mechanism shaping the process of wage formation in Portugal is
the extension of collective agreements by the Ministry of Employment which
reaches 90 percent of the Portuguese private sector, most times setting the
same conditions for companies with very different sizes and economic environ-
ments. For this reason, the contents of these agreements tend to be general,
setting minimum working conditions in particular the base monthly wage for
each job title, overtime pay and the normal duration of work. Moreover, only
a narrow set of topics is updated annually, and therefore the content of col-
lective agreements is often pointed out as being too immobile and containing
little innovation (Addison, Portugal and Vilares, 2015). Nevertheless, Car-
doso and Portugal (2005) show that firms often deviate from the wage floors
agreed upon for each category of workers, paying higher wages to adjust for
firm-specific conditions.
In this context it is more likely that firms benefit from inflation, by al-
lowing firms to comply both with mandatory wage floors and the prohibition
1In Portuguese, the labor code says: “É proibido ao empregador diminuir a retribuição,
salvo nos casos previstos neste Código ou em instrumento de regulamentação coletiva de
trabalho”.
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to cut wages while simultaneously decreasing real wages which provides a
leeway for adjustment, if it is needed. Conversely, in a low inflation environ-
ment, nominal rigidities may impede companies to adjust to product demand
shocks through wage accommodations. The last crisis, when both produc-
tivity growth and inflation were very low, gives some insights on how firms
adjusted in such setting. As depicted in figure 1, during the great recession,
the response of employers was, to a large extent, to freeze wages so as to
reduce real wages as much as possible. In such an extreme case the pace of
real adjustment is essentially set out by the inflation rate.
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4 Dataset
The dataset used for this study is Quadros de Pessoal (QP) which is an an-
nual administrative matched employer-employee dataset. Each year, every
establishment in Portugal with at least one employee is legally obliged to fill
in a standardized requirement with detailed information on worker’s charac-
teristics, firm’s characteristics and the establishment itself (See Cardoso et
al. 2012 for detailed information).2
One important advantage of using QP is its highly accurate wage data.
These data are collected through employer-reported wage information rather
than worker-reported information which tends to be more imprecise. More-
over, the fact that the information contained in the QP survey needs, by law,
to be available in a public space at the establishment and submitted through
regular quality checks by the Ministry of Employment (the entity respon-
sible for the dataset) further ensures a high degree of accuracy. Therefore,
in contrast with a large portion of previous literature, the empirical strat-
egy used in this study does not account for measurement errors as they are
likely to be mitigated in the dataset employed. A "clean" dataset is particu-
larly important here, as reporting errors could severely bias the estimates on
the degree of DNWR. Nevertheless, one important limitation of this dataset
is the short time period covered (1986-2013). There are few observations
regarding the inflation rate and unemployment rate, even though these vari-
ables varied widely over the period analyzed which makes the identification
of the corresponding parameters less problematic.
The final sample spans from 1986 to 2013 and comprises only job stayers
(workers staying in the same firm in two consecutive years), aging from 18 to
64 years old, and full-time workers. The source for the unemployment and
price series is INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística). The inflation rate is
measured by the log difference of Consumer Price Index.
Finally, in this study, the base wage is used instead of total compensation.
There are two main reasons for taking this decision. Firstly, the base wage is
2The dataset does not include the years 1990 and 2001. Additionally, public adminis-
tration and non-market services are excluded.
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the portion of earnings that is more likely to be subject to downward nominal
wage rigidity since it is the main target of negotiation between firms and trade
unions. Secondly, considering extra compensations may bias the degree of
nominal rigidity as these are more volatile and prone to measurement errors.
In this sense, base wages allow to obtain a “cleaner”picture of wage formation
than total compensation. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that other regular
compensations may help firms to adjust to negative shocks since these are




The estimation procedure used in this study tests the impact of inflation on
firms’wage policy, based on the work of Altonji and Devereux (2000) and
Fehr and Goette (2005). The underlying idea is that firms find it costly to
cut nominal wages, either due to the resistance of workers to this policy,
or firms’reluctance in doing so because it reduces workers’morale (hence,
productivity), or both. One way to model this feature is to assume that
worker’s nominal wage change, in the absence of DNWR, is defined by the
following equation (denoted by “notional" wage change):3
∆ ln(W ∗it) = Xitβ + θπt + φ∆ut + εit
However, when downward nominal wage rigidities are taken into account,
a fraction of workers scheduled for a wage cut will instead have a wage freeze.
A nominal freeze occurs when the "notional" wage change is between a spe-
cific threshold (cit) and zero:
∆ ln(Wit) =

∆ ln(W ∗it), if ∆ ln(W
∗
it) > 0
0, if − cit < ∆ ln(W ∗it) < 0
∆ ln(W ∗it), if ∆ ln(W
∗
it) < −cit , ∆ ln(W ∗it) < 0

where ∆ ln(W ∗it) is the "notional" wage change and ∆ ln(Wit) stands for the
first difference of the natural logarithm of observed monthly nominal wage
of individual i at time t; Xit is a vector of firm and individual observable
characteristics (age,tenure, education, gender and firm size); πt is the infla-
tion rate and ∆ut is the first difference of unemployment rate, a business
cycle indicator; εit stands for the usual error term. In addition, it is assumed
that the threshold follows a normal distribution and is uncorrelated with εit.
cit ∼ N(µic, σc)
3This can be interpreted as the effi cient wage that maximizes firm’s expected profit
when wages are flexible (Altonji and Devereux, 2000)
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This model is appropriate to study wage rigidity as it explicitly describes
the restriction imposed to firms arising from DNWR and, at the same time, is
flexible enough to allow for a nominal wage cut if the “notional" wage change
is suffi ciently negative (i.e. below −cit). Modelling wage rigidity in this way
has several advantages. Firstly, it provides a natural way to measure the
degree of downward nominal wage rigidity, where a perfectly flexible labor
market exists if cit = 0, and a rigid one if cit → +∞ (i.e. no wage cuts).4
Secondly, specifying an individual threshold as in Fehr and Goette (2005)
instead of a constant threshold (Altonji and Devereux, 2000) imposes less
counterfactual implications.5 Thirdly, and one of the main contributions of
this paper, it is possible to specify a functional form for the mean threshold
(µ
it
) as a function of observable micro and macroeconomic factors.
µ
it
= Xitλ+ γ1πt + γ2∆ut
where the variables above have the same meaning as before.
The latter equation provides a measure for the degree of DNWR in Por-
tugal, as a higher average threshold implies more nominal rigidity. Further-
more, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study explicitly modelling
the rigidity parameter as a function of observable characteristics, most no-
tably macroeconomic variables (inflation and unemployment), which is cru-
cial to understand what drives downward nominal wage rigidity. Following
the line of reasoning of Devicienti (2002), one possible reason for the lack
of this parameterization in previous literature might be that this makes the
model harder to estimate due to lack of a rich dataset.
4Altonji and Devereux (2000) suggested that the U.S labor market is closer to a per-
fectly rigid labor market than a flexible one, by using a similar model.
5In contrast to the model presented in this study, the approach followed by Altonji and
Devereux (2000) imposes that no wage cuts exist in the interval [−c, 0].
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6 Empirical Results
6.1 Wage rigidity across workers and firms
Table 1: Estimation of the empirical model
Variables Wage Equation Threshold Equation
Log age -0.036*** 0.060***
(0.003) (0.014)














Number of observations 24,195,747
Log likelihood 12,583,324
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 1 presents the results from the empirical model proposed in the
previous section. The wage setting equation shows the determinants for
wage growth. It is found that older workers and those more attached to
the firm face lower wage growth rates. Furthermore, education does not
have a statistically significant impact on nominal wage growth. The same
holds for gender. It is also found that workers in larger firms have a higher
wage growth, which may reflect that larger firms have better opportunities
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to make their workers more productive. Finally, the semi-elasticity of wages
with respect to aggregate unemployment for stayers (φ) is negative, showing
that (real) wages are procyclical (Carneiro et al. 2012). Regarding the effect
of inflation (θ), one cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is a one-
for-one relation between nominal (base) wages and consumer prices, thus
showing that wages are likely to be fully indexed to inflation.
The threshold equation shows the determinants for a higher degree of
nominal rigidity. Under the Portuguese legal framework of forbidden wage
cuts, one should expect that cit −→ +∞ , as any counterfactual wage cut
should be converted into a freeze. However, a (small) fraction of workers
were confronted with a wage cut due to the fact that labor law provides some
exceptional cases.6 Nevertheless, the threshold is expected to be large. The
estimates reveal that older workers offer a higher resistance against wage cuts.
This may reflect the higher propensity for workers to become unionized when
they are older (Vilares, 2013) or the higher risk-aversion associated with age
which makes the worker willing to negociate a constant wage against the risk
of adverse events. Another possible explanation is that older workers have
higher standards of fairness than younger ones. Furthermore, male workers
have a higher degree of rigidity than females, on average. This may be the
case because female workers have less bargaining power over wages (MacLeod
and Malcomson, 1993) or lower fairness standards than males (Akerlof and
Yellen, 1990). Also, education does increase the degree of nominal rigidity as
firms might be more reluctant to cut wages for high skilled workers because
their replacement is more costly to the firm (e.g. training costs) and their
effort is less easily monitored (Caju et al., 2012). By contrast, tenure does
not have a significant impact on the degree of wage rigidity. Regarding firm’s
size, it is found that smaller firms face a higher degree of nominal rigidity
possibly because, under the Macleod and Malcomson model, it is easier for
workers to coordinate in a smaller environment to inflict a cost on the firm
(e.g. strikes).
6Two other explanations are possible: Firms do not comply with the labor law, or wage
cuts are due to measurement error. However, both are very unlikely. The latter due to
the quality of the dataset used, as already mentioned. The prior because not complying
with the law results in heavy sanctions to the firm.
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Finally, the threshold equation suggest that inflation does ease labor mar-
ket adjustments, through a positive effect on the mean threshold, while un-
employment has a statistically significant negative impact. During recessions
and/or low inflation, firms are more likely to accommodate wage cuts, thus
facing higher average labor costs. This finding supports the fact that infla-
tion allows real (base) wages to adjust downwards when these are nominally
rigid. To further reinforce this point, the following sections are devoted to
clarify how inflation facilitates wage adjustments.
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6.2 Implications from the empirical model
To provide robustness to the empirical model proposed in the previous sec-
tion, figure 2 shows the predicted fraction of wage freezes against their ob-
served values.
Notably, the probability of a wage freeze exhibit an upward trend during
the period covered, most notably in the last years when the economy faced
a severe economic downturn along with low inflation, which the model pre-
dicts with a high degree of precision. This behaviour sharply contrast with
the probability of a worker having a wage cut, which is low and quite stable
over time ( 2 - 4%), a result consistent with the Portuguese institutional
framework of wage formation that sets legal boundaries to nominal wage de-
creases. As a complement to this analysis, the marginal effects of inflation
and (variation in) unemployment on these probabilities were retrieved from
the empirical model proposed in the previous section (Table 2). As expected,
a higher inflation rate and decreases in unemployment contribute to a lower
probability of a nominal wage freeze. Conversely, these macroeconomic vari-
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ables do not seem to have a large impact on the probability of a nominal
wage cut, even though statistically significant.
Table 2: Estimation of marginal effects on wage freezes and cuts
Variables Marginal effect of π Marginal effect of ∆u
Probability of a nominal wage freeze -3.920*** 0.089***
Probability of a nominal wage cut -0.150*** 0.002***
Note: All marginal effects are analytically derived from the empirical model proposed (See appendix 8.1);
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Nevertheless, the potential implications of inflation are not invariant to
the business cycle. Figure 3 simulates the probability of having a freeze
for different inflation rates and (variations in) unemployment rate. This
highlights that low inflation leads to a disproportionally high levels of nominal
freezes, and this effect becomes sharper when the economy faces a downturn.
This exercise motivates one of the underlying reasons exacerbating the impact
of the last financial crisis. Firms were facing a severe downturn and inflation
did proved to be insuffi cient for firms to adjust real wages to this shock.
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Another interesting aspect to consider is to know how much was the
average nominal increase in labor costs due to the inability of (base) wages
to adjust downwards. The estimates for this "wage sweep-up" by year is
shown in Figure 3.7 It is revealing to note the upward trend in these costs,
specially after the great recession, which peaked to about 6-7%. This lack
of wage adjustment may compromise future wage increases by the effect of
“pent-up wage deflation” (Janet Yellen, 2014). Furthermore, it should be
emphasized that inflation could partially mitigate these costs by allowing
real wages to adjust downwards.
7The derivation can be found in appendix 8.2.
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Finally, the model allows me to simulate what would have been the adjust-
ment of wages if inflation was higher (say, 4%).8 The figures below present
the predicted real wage distribution for 2013 in two different settings: (i)
when inflation is -0.3%, the observed value in that year. (ii) When inflation
is 4%.
The left panel describes the actual situation for Portugal in 2013, charac-
terized by a wage change distribution almost collapsing to zero, with nearly
80% of wage freezes, and an inflation rate that does not provide a leeway for
real wage cuts. When contrasting this with the right panel, we observe that
a higher inflation rate allows real wages to decrease not only for workers hav-
ing a nominal wage freeze but also a fraction of those having a nominal wage
increase. Also, this larger margin of manoeuvre for real wage adjustments
reduces the need of nominal freezes (in this simulation, reduces to slightly
above 50%).
84% inflation is chosen arbitrarily, based on the value proposed by Blanchard (2010).
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7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the extent of downward nominal rigidity in Portugal
under different macroeconomic conditions, by using a representative dataset
(Quadros de Pessoal) which contains rich and very accurate wage data. The
results show that Portugal is characterized by extreme downward nomi-
nal wage rigidity, which is consistent with the Portuguese labor law and
a strongly unionized labor market. In this paper, we further highlight dif-
ferences in the degree of rigidity across workers and firms, explained by the
patterns predicted by several labour market theories.
A focus on the impact of inflation is sustained throughout this study. It
is found that inflation render downward nominal wage rigidity less binding,
in line with previous literature, and that this effect tends to be stronger
when the economy faces a severe downturn. Based on the latter argument, a
simulation was executed to show the "benefits" from an increased inflation
during the last financial crisis and emphasize the extent to which low inflation
contributed for a binding downward nominal wage rigidity.
Finally, the empirical model allowed me to derive to which extent the
absence of (downward) wage adjustments may impact on real labor costs.
In the aftermath of the great recession, a truly binding DNWR leaded to a
wage markup that peaked to about 6-7%.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Probability of a Freeze
For simplicity, assume that ∆ ln(W ∗it) = Xitβ+ εit and cit = Xitγ+ vit where
both, εit and vit, follow a normal distribution and are uncorrelated with each
other.
The probability of having a wage freeze can de defined as:
Pr[−cit < ∆ ln(W ∗it) < 0] = F ( x1, x2, ρ)
where F (.) stands for the c.d.f of the standard bivariate normal



















] + φ(x2)Φ(x1)[− βσε ]
where φ(.) and Φ(.) stand for the p.d.f and c.d.f of the standard univariate
normal distribution, respectively.
8.2 Wage sweep-up
Using the same notation as above, the wage sweep-up can be written as:
E[∆ ln(Wit)−∆ ln(W ∗it)] = Pr(wage increase) ∗ E[Xitβ + εit|
Xitβ + εit > 0] + Pr(wage cut) ∗ E[Xitβ + εit|
Xitβ + εit < 0, Xitβ + εit < −cit]−Xitβ
The latter expression simplifies to:
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